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Post—Retirement Adjustments of Pension Benefits
ABSTRACT
This paper examines why pension plans increased their liabflities by
giving benefit increases to persons no longer working even though almost all
of them were not required to do so by any legally enforceable contract. In
our model workers and firms have implicit contracts under which post—
retirement increases in benefits are purchased by workers through lower
wages or initial benefits. Such arrangements permit both plans arid workers
to share the risk of uncertain rates of return. They also allow beneficiaries
to invest at a higher net rate of return than they could obtain elsewhere
because of tax advantages and, in large plans, economies of scale. We
also discuss how post—retirement adjustments can be used to influence
turnover.
Some empirical implications of the model are tested over a sample of
beneficiaries of defined benefit plans. The major empirical findings are:
(1) There is strong evidence of compensating differentials in final
salary and initial pension benefits for beneficiaries receiving post—
retirement adjustments.
(2) Regardless of how the size of pension plans is measured
(beneficiaries, participants, amount of benefits paid),
large pension plans provide larger post—retirement benefit
increases.
(3) Beneficiaries of collectively bargained plans are more likely
to receive benefit increases and, among those receiving benefit
increases, receive larger increases.
(4) Benefit increases are larger in percentage terms for those who











What happens to an individual's private pension benefits after he
retires? Until recently, economists and policy analysts have assumed they
remained constant in nominal terms, even in periods of severe inflation.
Feldstein (1983) and Summers (1983) even have developed models explaining
why individuals prefer not to have indexed pensions. These models are
consistent with the observation that very few plans provide for automatic
adjustments and the assumption that ad hoc increases are uncommon and, when
granted, quite small. Three recent surveys of large plans (Bankers Trust,
1980; Hay Associates l981; and Hewitt Associates, 1981) show approximately
two—thirds of large plans giving one or more ad hoc increases during the
last half of the i970s (see King, 1982). However, these surveys did not
consider small or medium-sized plans, leaving open the question of how
widespread the increases really were; also they did not compare the size of
the increase to initial benefits of specific individuals, leaving open the
question of their magnitude.
The assumption that post—retirement adjustments are relatively rare has
been important in much of the recent theoretical literature on the nature of
the pension contract. Barnow and Ehrenberg (1979) and Bulow (1982b) develop
models of a firm's pension liability (or cost) under conditions that assume
no post—retirement increases in benefits. If plans do award such benefit
increases, these models underestimate pension liabilities.
The perception that pension benefits are fixed in nominal terms is also
one of the primary reasons that older persons are thought to be adversely
affected by inflation (Okuri, 1970; White House Conference on Aging, 1982).
This had led to a policy debate and research examining the desirability of2
requiring or encouraging automatic cost of living adjustments (papers by
Clark and Spengler, Munnell, and Greenough in Clark, 1980; President's
Commission on Pension Policy, 1981). Our understanding of the economic
well-being of the elderly during inflationary periods and the value of such
regulations will then be enhanced by studying post—retirement benefit
changes.
Table 1 reports evidence from Clark, Allen, and Sumner (1983) on the
magnitude of post—retirement adjustments between 1973 and 1979 for a
nationally representative sample of persons in defined benefit plans who
were already retired in 1973. The mean benefit rose from $2128 in1973 to
$2638 in 1979. This increase of $510 amounted to 24 percent of the 1973
benefit. These increases were very widespread, as 75 percent of all
beneficiaries received at least one increase and 25 percent received an
increase in every year. Among only those receiving increases, the mean 1979
benefit was 32 percent larger than the mean 1973 benefit.
Since inflation was particularly high during this period, it is
interesting to compare the rate of increase of nominal benefits to the rate
of increase of prices. This is not to say that these benefit increases are
attributable to inflation. As we will explain in more detail below, these
increases could just as easily be attributed to a risk—sharing arrangement,
in which the uncertain parameter is the pension fund's nominal rate of return.
This more general framework allows us to explain not only the benefit
increases given in the 1970s, but also those given by some plans in periods
in which the inflation rate was very low. With this proviso in mind, the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thus, the mean rate of increase in pension benefits for all beneficiaries
equalled 38 percent of the inflation rate. Among only those receiving
benefit increases, the mean rate of increase in benefits equalled 51 percent
of the CPI increase.
Another interesting way to look at the magnitude of these increases is
to ask how much effect they had on pension liabilities. Over this six—
year period, benefits rose at an average annual rate of 4.7 percentin plans
giving increases. Assuming either a 7 or 10 percent discount rate, the
benefit increases raised by 14 percent the present value of benefits paid
between 1973 and 1979. Since the mean age of retirement in our sample was
62, the average retiree could expect to receive benefits for 18 years. If
his benefits continued to increase at a 4.7 percent rate, the planTs liability
for this worker's lifetime benefits would increase by 44 percent at a 7 per-
cent discount rate and by 39 percent at a 10 percent discount rate.
This paper examines why pension plans increase their liabilities to
such a large extent when not required to do so by any explicit contract.In
our model workers and firms have implicit contracts under which post-
retirement increases are purchased by the worker through lower wages,
lower initial benefits, or reductions in other forms of compensation.In
return the worker receives (1) the prospect of a higher after—tax rate of
return from reinvesting some of his pension wealth in the plan during the
early years of retirement (as opposed to investing it on his own) and (2) a
hedge against inflation and rate—of—return risk, the magnitude of which
depends upon the composition of the plan's portfolio. The compensating
differentials framework has been used by Ehrenberg (1980), Schilier and4
Weiss (1980), and Smith (1981) to examine tradeoffs between wages and both
the magnitude of and likelihood of receiving pension benefits. We also
explore how post—retirement adjustments can be used to influence employee
behavior. Some empirical implications of our model are then tested over a
sample of beneficiaries collected by the Department of Labor from a
representative set of defined benefit pension plans.
Rationale for Post—Retirement Adjustments
Between 1973 and 1979 most beneficiaries received increases in their
nominal pension payments after they had retired. Virtually none of these
increases were required by any formal contract. Why, then, are defined
benefit plans voluntarily raising their pension liabilities? The explanation
offered in this paper is the existence of an implicit contract between the
plan and both workers and retirees, in which the plan guarantees a minimum
nominal annuity plus the possibility of post—retirement adjustments in the
future. The quid pro quo for future benefit increases is lower wages, lower
initial benefits, or some other form of compensating differential. An unusual
feature of this form of compensating differential is that the worker must
pay before he benefits. Therefore, the existence of such contracts will
depend in part on the confidence of the worker or retiree in the reliability
of the future payment.
Consider the case of a person who is about to retire and wants to select
the optimal payment schedule for receiving his pension benefits. Suppose he
has two alternatives. The first is the conventional retirement annuity fixed
at the same nominal level in each future period. The second is a promise of a
stream of pension benefits where a minimum nominal payment per period is5
guaranteed to the worker but benefit increases may be granted in the future.
The latter arrangement is the "implicit contract" model described in Pesando
(1984). His model is motivated by the widespread tendency to finance
post—retirement adjustments out of "excess" plan earnings (earnings above the
level required by the rate of return used in evaluating the plan's
liabilities). Here we address the question of when such contracts are
preferable to workers.
The implicit contract works in the following fashion. Consider a
two-period retirement framework where L1, 1 1, 2 indicates benefits in
each period. There is a minimum guaranteed benefit (Lm), which is set so the
plan is fully funded for both periods based on the plan's interest rate
assumption r. This rate will be less than the risk—free interest rate and as
a result, Lm will be lower than the benefit in a fixed annuity plan (or
contributions during the working period must be higher). This initial benefit
or wage offset is required because benefits are assumed to be adjusted only in
an upward direction, not downwardly. We also assume the minimum guaranteed
benefit is paid in the first period. Letting A be the contribution in the
pre-retirement period required to fully fund benefits of Lm in each period, we
have A(l+r)2/(2+rv) =Lm.Let r be the actual rate of eturn earned by the
plan's assets.If r > r, then the plan provides a benefit L2 equal to the
total remaining assets in the fund, i.e., L2 =(A(l+r) Lm)(l+r).If
r < r, then L2 =Lm.
This contract allows the worker to receive returns to the fund's assets
above the threshold indicated by r. It also allows the worker and the firm
to share the risks of uncertain rates of return in contrast to the conventional6
defined benefit plan in which the firm is usually assumed to bear all of the
risk of nominal rates of return arid defined contribution plans in which the
worker supposedly bears all of such risk.It offers the worker some
insurance against unexpectedly high rates of inflation as long as the plan's
rate of return has a positive covariance with inflation. The amount of
inflation insurance depends on the composition of the pension fund's port-
folio. Feldstein (1983) has shown that unless the worker has an infinite
degree of risk aversion, full indexation is not optimal.'
In return for these benefits the worker must accept a lower wage, a
smaller initial benefit, or both. The equilibrium condition is the sum of
the present value of earnings, guaranteed pension benefits in both periods,
and the expected magnitude of the post-retirement adjustment in the second
period equals the present value of the marginal product while working.2
The choice between the fixed nominal annuity and the "implicit contract"
boils down to an exercise in the optimal intertemporal allocation of income
under uncertainty. There are a number of important sources of uncertainty to
consider. We will focus on the plan's nominal rate of return, the nominal
rate of return on assets held by the worker, and the likelihood the plan will
meet its obligations. Even though workers and retirees in any plan are
heterogeneous in both their preferences toward risk and their risk—bearing
ability, they will be covered by the same set of rules defining the contract.
A non-union plan will adopt a decision rule such as selecting the contract
that maximizes the utility from pension wealth of the marginal worker. In a
plan covered by collective bargaining, a different decision rule will be
applied, such as maximizing the utility from pension wealth of the median7
union member (who may be retired). The implications of these differences
for union and non—union plan behavior will be discussed later.
Cross—sectional differences in the demand for post—retirement adjustments
will be related directly to the expected difference between the after—tax rate
of return earned by the plan after the worker retires and the after-tax rate
of return the worker expects to receive on his own assets.3Although we have
no direct information on the expected rates of return earned by each plan in
our sample, there are a number of reasons to believe this variable is highly
correlated with plan size. First, part of the cost of administering a pension
plan is fixed, especially investment and actuarial services. According to
Smeeding (1983), this produces economies of scale with respect to custodial
(administrative overhead) fees and securities commissions for portfolio
adjustments, especially the latter. Smeeding reports that these fees fall
from 5.90 percent for IRA or Keogh plans to 4.43 percent for small pension
plans to 3.54 percent for large pension plans. Mitchell and Andrews (1981)
also show dramatic declines in administrative expenses per participant among
multi-employer plans, especially among plans with fewer than 3000 par-
ticipants. Second, small defined benefit plans must make more conservative
actuarial assumptions because of longevity risk. As plan size decreases,
the longevity distribution of its beneficiaries is less likely to approxi-
mate that of the entire population. This increases the likelihood that a
sizable proportion of beneficiaries will live longer than expected and redu-
ces the benefit that can be offered for a given contribution. Third, among
plans funded through trusts, the assets of each plan must be segregated from
those of all other plans. This makes it very difficult for small plans to8
obtain adequate diversification. Although this constraint can be avoided by
funding the plan through an insurance company, the administrative fees or
contingency reserves required by insurers usually fall in percentage terms
with the dollar volume of annual contributions (see McGill, 1975).
An indirect test of whether some or all of these factors make rates of
return an increasing function of plan size is to examine actuarial interest
rate assumptions. Malca (1975) reports these assumptions for 1972 and 1973
from a Standard and Poor's survey. The results show the median asumption for
the largest size category was 5.5 percent, compared to 4.8 to 5.0 percent for
plansin intermediate size categories and 4.5 percent for plans in the
smallest category.In summary, as long as large plans are expected to realize
larger rates of return and rates of return for individual workers and retirees
are randomly distributed across plans, individuals in large plans should be
more willing to purchase post—retirement adjustments. In addition to rate of
return differences, this coefficient will also reflect the effect of
unobserved factors correlated with the size of pension plans.
Taxes are an additional factor affecting the difference between the
expected rate of return for the plan and the return the worker expects to
receive on his own assets after retirement. Assets can accumulate at a tax-
free rate in the pension plan, whereas retirees must pay taxes on earnings from
their investments. For those who intend to save part of their pension
benefits in the initial years of retirement, this provides an incentive for
the implicit contract outlined here. Unfortunately, our data set lacks the
detail necessary to construct marginal tax rates for beneficiaries. Some of
these effects will be picked up by the other variables in the empirical
model outlined below.9
Post—retirement adjustments are usually granted on an ad hoc basis rather
than through any formal escalator clause. For instance, in our sample only
seven plans had explicit contractual provisions for automatic adjustments at
regular intervals. These intervals can be quite long; one plan required
adjustment every three years and another required them every sixth year. If
the contract for post—retirement adjustments is implicit and not legally
enforceable, the plan stands to gain considerably by reneging on the
agreement. The probability of cheating, in turn, determines the probability
that such contracts are acceptable to workers.
The cost to the plan of cheating is reduced ability to write similar
implicit contracts in the future, since workers will simultaneously lower the
mean expected return and raise the expected variance from buying these
contracts. It also may cause the expected real present value of the
"guaranteed" minimum benefits to fall, especially in underfunded plans in
which liabilities are not fully covered by insurance. These costs are
likely to be especially sizable for large firms because (1) information
about their activites is likely to spread more widely through the labor
market and (2) assuming labor is more specialized in large firms, they are
more likely to use pension plans to reduce turnover and the costs of
investing in specific on—the—job training. If the likelihood of cheating is
lower in large plans, this gives us an additional reason for expecting
larger post—retirement adjustments in such plans.
Potentially, unions can act as enforcement agents to prevent cheating by
the plan and increase the likelihood of post—retirement adjustments. Even10
though such adjustments are not a mandatory bargaining topic,4 unions have
ample means to pressure employers to discuss the matter. Whether this is
in the union's interest is an empirical question. Many workers have the
same incentive as the firm to violate arrangements made with retirees, since
they can use the strike threat to obtain a share of the capital gains. On
the other hand, other workers will not want to forfeit the option of using
post—retirement adjustments as a device for investments or risk—sharing
when they retire. This is especially likely to be true for older workers.
Both the median voter model and recent empirical findings by Freeman (1983)
on pension plan provisions indicate that the preferences of older workers
receive much more weight than those of younger workers in forming union
objectives. This makes it more likely that unions will act in their
interests.
Another factor encouraging unions to act in this fashion is the activity
of retirees in union political affairs. Retirees can sometimes vote for union
officers and attend union conventions. In the United Mine Workers they even
vote on contract ratification. This means distributing a portion of any rents
obtained in negotiations to retirees can yield a political payoff to union
officers. In contrast, retiree preferences will receive zero weight in a
non—union setting, making an intergenerational transfer from workers to
retirees unlikely. Thus, we expect larger post-retirement adjustments in
collectively bargained plans because of (1) greater costs to the firm for
reneging on the implicit contract and (2) a preference—weighting scheme tilted
toward retirees and older workers.11
In addition to post-retirement adjustments existing as a form of
compensation for which workers must pay, firms may use these contracts to
regulate employee behavior. Unvested pensions can reduce turnover by
increasing the cost of taking a job at another establishment. In inflationary
periods, pension benefit formulas based on salaries also penalize job
changers, since the formulas are based on nominal rather than real salaries
(see Clark and McDermed, 1982, and Bulow, 1982a). Post—retirement
adjustments can be distributed in order to either maintain or exacerbate these
effects.ifl Clark, Alien, and Sumner (1983), we found that 17 percent of the
plans giving adjustments increased benefits by a straight percentage, whereas
27 percent made the magnitude of the increase a function of years of service.
Furthermore, eligibility for increases in some of the plans was limited to
workers with a minimum amount of preretirement service ranging between 10 to
20 years.
Theoretically, it is not clear that post-retirement adjustments would be
a more or less effective device than the benefit formula itself for
influencing employee quit decisions. Conceivably, post—retirement adjustments
simultaneously increase the returns from working an additional year with the
firm (via an implicit contract in which the magnitude of future benefit increases
is linked to tenure) and reduce the variance of expected real pension wealth
for workers by insuring against inflation risk. If these effects have a
greater impact on turnover than an upward adjustment in the benefit formula
costing an equal amount, such an approach may be optimal. To put the same
point somewhat differently, by giving post—retirement adjustments to its
retirees, the firm hopes to change the expectations of its current workers so
that they value their pension contract in real rather than nominal terms12
Another possibility is that since the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) has made it more difficult for firms to use vesting requirements to
discourage turnover, basing post—retirement adjustments on years of service is
now a second-best mechanism for achieving the same result. Regulation of
explicit pension contracts may also explain why firms have adopted implicit
contracts.5
Data Description
The Pension Benefit Master File (PBMF), made available to the authors
by the Department of Labor, is the primary data source for this study.
These data are from a stratified random sample of pension plans filing
series 5500 and 5500C forms in 1975. The PBMF combines information from the
Arthur Young and Company Survey of Private Pension Benefits Amounts with
Social Security information from the Summary Earnings Record and from a
standard summarization of the Master Beneficiary Record, known as the Survey
Benefit Summary Record. The Arthur Young survey contained information on
671,000 persons receiving benefits on December 31, 1978 from 446 plans of
371 sponsors. In all but two cases where more than one plan per sponsor was
reported, the second and/or third plan was not part of the formal sampling
process but was provided along with the requested plan data by the
responding plan. These additional plans were deleted from the analysis,
since they were assigned a zero plan weight in the sampling process.
Weights provided by the Department of Labor enabled us to construct weighted
samples of individuals and plans that were representative of the set of pen—
sion plans that existed in 1975.13
Although the PBMF included defined contribution as well as defined
benefit plans, this analysis concentrates exclusively on the defined benefit
plans. The defined contribution plans were excluded because of limitations in
the sampling procedure that made it impossible to determine potential benefit
increases for many of these plans. In addition, only 50 percent of the
beneficiaries in the five largest plans in the Arthur Young survey were
matched with the Social Security data because of a resource constraint
imposed by the Social Security Administration. The weights for individuals
in these plans were doubled to compensate for the decrease in the sample
size. Persons in any plan receiving a lump sum distribution were eliminated
from the sample.
The PBMF contained information reported by firms on individuals who were
receiving benefits in December 1978. Data were included on age, year of
retirement, years of credited service, sex, race, marital status, Social
Security reported earnings, and the current pension benefit. All benefit
amounts were converted to an annual benefit. In addition, plan charac-
teristics such as union status, number of beneficiaries, and industrial
category also were reported. Specific questions were asked about any
increases in post—retirement benefits awarded between January 1, 1973 and
January 1, 1979. Plan sponsors were asked to indicate the size and method
of each increase, date of each increase and types of beneficiaries eligible
for each increase.
Using this information, we were able to construct annual pension benefits
from 1973 to 1979 for most of the beneficiaries. This task required that
individuals in each plan be examined carefully to determine if they were
eligible to receive an increase. Then, using the increase formula, the14
magnitude of the increase for each individual was calculated. Working
backwards over the six-year period, we determined the annual benefit for most
of the beneficiaries in the sample. Some plans failed to report information
such as years of service that was necessary to reconstruct benefit increases.
In these plans we attempted to use related information in the PBMF to
construct appropriate proxies for the missing data. For several plans, this
was impossible and they were deleted from the sample.
The reported benefit on the PBMF is assumed to be the benefit a person
would receive throughout 1979. Benefit increases reported in one year are
assumed to take effect in January of the following year. For example, the
1979 benefit reported on the PBMF reflects all 1978 increases. Thus, to
determine the 1978 benefit we subtract the implied increase from the 1979
benefit. This process continues until annual benefits from 1973 to 1979 are
calculated. This paper reports the results of an analysis of post—retirement
benefit increases for persons who were retired throughout this period.
Thus, we selected individuals who were already retired at the beginning of
1973 so that they were receiving benefits during the entire period.
To estimate post—retirement benefit adjustment equations, some additional
restrictions had to be imposed on the sample.In three plans the average per-
cent increase in nominal benefits was over 190 percent.In no other plan,
however, was the average increase more than 75 percent. Although the 1979
benefits in these plans were comparable to those of other plans in the
sample, the derived 1973 benefits were unusually small. We attribute this
to incomplete or inaccurate information provided us about how benefit
increases between 1973 and 1979 were calculated. These three plans are15
excluded from the sample. This problem also arose for some individuals in
other plans, again presumably because of errors in reporting benefit changes
in complete detail. Accordingly all individuals with 1973 benefits of less
than $10 are excluded from the sample. Finally, there were severe reporting
errors in or missing values for three of the independent variables (years of
service, year of retirement, and age at retirement; for example, average age
at retirement in one plan was 85) in twelve of the plans.These plans were
dropped from the sample. When only one or two of these variables were
missing or implausible, sample means were substituted for the reported
value. All estimates reported below are derived using the PBMF sampling
weights. The weighting is necessary because large plans were intentionally
overrepresented in the survey.
Empirical Specification
The rationales for post-retirement adjustments offered above have empirical
implications that are testable over the PBMF. The compensating differential
implies a tradeoff between post—retirement adjustments and either wages or ini-
tial benefits. Large plans are more likely to provide post—retirement adjust-
ments because of higher rates of return and a lower probability of reneging on
the implicit contract. The latter factor, along with the political dominance of
older workers and retirees, makes collectively bargained plans more likely to
provide post—retirement adjustments. If these adjustments are used to
discourage turnover, they should be correlated with years of service.
We will focus most of our attention on a specification in which the
dependent variable is the change in benefits between 1973 and 1979 divided by
1973 benefits. This variable is not distributed normally because it is16
truncated from below at zero. To shed more light on the determinants of where
any individual is likely to be in that distribution, we estimate OLS
regressions for a binary variable indicating whether a person ever received an
increase in his benefit and for the ratio of the change in benefits to 1973
benefits for those who received increases. Although OLS is not the most
appropriate estimation technique for a binary dependent variable, alternatives
such as probit or maximum likelihood logit are quite expensive for a sample
of over 130,000 observations. Since switching from OLS to one of the other
techniques generally does not radically alter estimates in large samples, we
did not feel such an expense was justified.
Comparison of 1973 and 1979 benefits can produce misleading conclusions
about the adjustment of benefits if there are important differences in the
timing of such adjustments. To take this into account, we consider two
additional dependent variables:(1) the number of increases given over this
period and (2) the ratio of the present value of real benefits between 1973
and 1979 to the present value of benefits that would have been received under
complete indexation.
Our choice of independent variables is restricted largely by the
available data. To estimate the tradeoff between wages and post—retirement
adjustments, we use the five—year salary average before retirement as the wage
variable. Annual salaries were estimated from the Social Security earnings
histories using Foxes (1979) method. Final five—year salary averages were not
available for persons retiring before 1956.initial benefits for this sample can-
not be determined, since our knowledge of benefit increases begins with 1973.
As a proxy we use 1973 benefits. This variable equals initial benefits plus any17
post-retirement adjustments granted before 1973.If these two variables are
independent, the 1973 benefit produces a downwardly biased estimate of the
tradeoff between initial benefits and post—retirement adjustments (because of
positive correlation between post—retirement adjustments before and after
1973). However, since our model predicts a negative correlation between ini-
tial benefits and post—retirement adjustments, the direction of bias cannot be
predicted.
Most, but not all, plans reported collective bargaining status on either
the PBMF or a file of EBS—l reports obtained from the National Bureau of
Economic Research. The collective bargaining status for some plans remained
unspecified. Rather than throwing out these observations, we use two union
status variables. The first indicates whether the plan was collectively
bargained; the second, whether collective bargaining status was unreported.
This allows the coefficient of the first variable to be interpreted as a
union-non-union difference. Union status is correlated with many other
variables, requiring some additional controls. A set of industry dummies at
roughly the 1—digit level of aggregation is included for this reason.
Our measure of plan size is the number of beneficiaries in 1979. Since
plan size can be measured in a number of additional dimensions, wealso
examined the number of participants and the dollar value of all benefits paid
to 1979 beneficiaries. These specifications produced very similar results and
are not reported. The years of service variable used is reported bythe
pension plan. This does not necessarily equal total years employed by a
given company, depending upon rules for participation in the plan. For
instance, years of credited service under the pension plan may be somewhat
smaller than total yearsemployed in the firm.18
Dummy variables corresponding to the year in which the person retired are
included in the model to test whether persons who have been retired the
longest are treated differently from recent retirees. Although this is an
important empirical question for measuring the economic well—being of the
elderly, our model does not address this issue.If post-retirement
adjustments result from implicit contracts to insure against inflation risk,
the optimal insurance policy could conceivably be one that provides the
largest payoffs to those who live the longest. Such insurance is cheaper
than a policy providing equal protection at all ages and, under fairly
reasonable assumptions, provides a greater reduction in wealth uncertainty
during retirement. For most individuals, self insurance will be more
efficient in the years immediately after retirement. They pay a
"deductible'1 for protection in later years by receiving relatively smaller
(or zero) post—retirement adjustments during first retirement years. Finally,
we include age at retirement, sex and race as independent variables. These
variables capture longevity risk differences or other differences not
accounted for in our specification.
Empirical Results
Although the PBMF includes individuals retiring since 1950, five—year
Social Security earnings data are available only for persons retiring since
1956. This forces us to examine two different samples to be able to both
estimate compensating differentials and measure the distribution of post-
retirement adjustments across the broadest possible number of cohorts.
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R2 — .051 .117 .069
N 129,057 129,057 137,038
-
aThe dependent variable is the ratio of the change in benefits between 1973 and 1979 to the 1973 benefit.
Binary variables indicating whether collective bargaining status is unreported, whether sex is unreported,
industryof employer, and year of retirement are also included.
bsample includes persons who retired from 1956 to 1972 for whom a final five—year salary average was
available. The weighted mean of the dependent variable is 0.285 over the 129,057 unweighted observations in this
sample.
CSamp1e includes persons who retired from 1950 to 1972. The weighted mean of the dependent variable is 0.308
over the 137,038 unweighted observations in this sample.19
over those retiring since 1956. A specification without the salary average
and initial benefit variables is reported so valid comparisons can be made to
the means and coefficients in columns 4 and 5 obtained when the sample is
expanded to include persons retiring since 1950. The dependent variable is
the ratio of the change in benefits between 1973 and 1979 to benefits in 1973.
The coefficients of both the salary average and the 1973 benefit variables
in column 3 are negative and large in absolute value relative to their
standard errors, as predicted by the compensating differentials model.
Controlling for other factors, a 10 percent increase in salary averaqe
reduces the amount of post—retirement adjustment over our six-year period by
about 0.5 percentage points. A 10 percent increase in 1973 pension level
reduces the post—retirement adjustment over the period by 2.9 percentage
points. Both of these results imply rather small losses in present value of
pension flows from post-retirement adjustments for large gains in final wage
or initial pensions.
The magnitude of the implied compensating wage differential indicates
that a pure tradeoff between forms of compensation is not being estimated. One
factor accounting for this is a tendency for all forms of compensation to be
positively related across workers or firms. Only by holding constant the
level of total compensation including unobservable job and worker charac-
teristics may pure compensating differentials be calculated.6All the
regressions in Table 2 include several controls that are positively related to
level of compensation, and coefficients for each of these variables (plan
size, unionization, tenure, age at retirement and male) are larger in column 3
than they are in column 2. This 'indicates that in column 2 they picked up part20
of the negative effect of salary and pension level on post—retirement adjust-
ments. Even given the controls, however, a considerable amount of
uncontrolled variation in post—retirement adjustments remains (witness the low
R2 values), so the magnitude Of the compensating differential estimates is
not surprising. A second reason for the small size of these coefficients is
that measurement error in both the initial benefit and salary average
variables downwardly biases their regression coefficients and, thus, upwardly
biases the estimate of the compensating wage differential.
A final explanation for large implied compensating differentials is that
the 1973 benefit variable is larger than initial benefits for all retirees who
received any post—retirement adjustment prior to 1973. Using a simulation
analysis, we estimated that by 1973, persons retiring between 1956 and 1960
already had received post—retirement increases of between 70 and 120 percent
of their initial benefits (Clark, Allen, and Sumner, 1983). This implies
that the 1973 benefit is approximately twice the size of the initial benefit
for these retirees. Thus, the tradeoff implied by the coefficients reported
in Table 2 for post—retirement increases as a percentage of the 1973 benefit
is larger in terms of the retiree's initial pension benefit. For the
pre-1960 retirees, the implied increase in benefits between 1973and 1979 is
about 6.0 percentage points (2.9 percent of the 1973 benefit is approximately
6.0 percent of initial benefit for these oldest retirees) for a 10 percent
decline in initial benefits. If this 6 percentage point increase is awarded
every 6 years and if a retiree lives 18 yearsafter retirement, the bene-
fit at death will be approximately 19 percent higher than the initial
benefit.7Although still not an equal trade in present value terms, such21
a ratio may reflect more accurately tradeoffs between initial benefits and
post—retirement adjustments.
Estimates of the other coefficients are generally consistent with
the reasoning presented earlier. The plan size coefficient indicates a
positive and significant impact of larger plan size on the magnitude of
post-retirement increases. A ten thousand-person increase in the number of
recipients in 1979 is associated with a 4.8 percentage point larger benefit
increase. The largest plan in the sample had 67,130 recipients in 1979;
the regression coefficient implies that this plan gave a 24 percentage point
larger increase than the average plan. The smallest plan in the sample had
one recipient. The estimated coefficient implies that it gave an 8.2 per-
centage point smaller increase than the average plan. A significant plan
size effect was found throughout our analysis as we varied the independent
variables in the equation and used alternative definitions of plan size.
The magnitude of the plan size coefficient declines somewhat when salary
average and 1973 benefit are deleted (column 2) or when the sample is
expanded to include persons retiring in the early 1950s (column 5) but it
remains significantly greater than zero.
Collectively bargained plans granted larger benefit increases than non—
collectively bargained plans. The increases in union plans were estimated to be
16.0 percentage points larger than those in non—union plans. At the sample means
the average union plan gave a 32.9 percent increase; the average non—union plan,
a 16.9 percent increase. Thus, increases in union plans were almost twice
those in the non-union plans. Table 2 indicates that the union coefficient
changes only slightly when the specification and sample are changed.822
Years of service is strongly correlated with benefit increases. An addi-
tional year of service is associated with a 1.6 percentage point larger increase
in benefits during the sample period. The age of retirement coefficient is
estimated with little precision. The sign indicates the magnitudes of adjust-
ments increase with later retirement. Use of firm—reported information about
whether the retirement was early, normal, or delayed did not improve the
precision of this estimate. Both the years of service and age at retirement
coefficients are more sensitive to changes in the specification and sample.
Age at retirement is the only variable for which the sign of the coefficient
changed in response to alternative specifications.
As for the other coefficients, post—retirement benefit increases are
insignificantly different by sex and race in the compensating differential model
shown in column 3. The deletion of the salary average and 1973 benefit from
the model produces estimates indicating larger post-retirement adjustments
for females and nonwhites. The industry variables (not shown in Table 2)
indicate that increases were larger in the mining, manufacturing and
transportation sectors of the economy.
The expanded sample of 1950-72 retirees is used to examine the magnitude of
benefit increases in percentage terms across cohorts. The year of retire-
ment means and coefficients are reported in the first two columns of Table
3. These coefficients come from the benefit change equation reported in
column 5 of Table 2. They indicate how the magnitude of the adjustment dif-
fers by year of retirement relative to a person retiring in 1972. The ratio
of the change in benefits between 1973 and 1979 to 1973 benefits by year of













































Table 3. Year—of-retirement coefficients and estimated change in benefits by






















































1963 .036 .251 .479 .757
(.013)
1964 .036 .176 .404 .638
(.013)
1965 .071 .177 .405 .640
(.010)
1966 .063 .160 .388 .613
(.010)
1967 .067 .125 .353 .558
(.010)
1968 .077 .069 .297 .469
(.010)
1969 .107 .045 .273 .431
(.009)
1970 .104 .029 .257 .406
(.009)
1971 .131 .026 .254 .401
(.008)
1972 .151 .360
aThe change in nominal benefits for persons retiring in a given year are
calculated for a white male union manufacturing worker with the mean values of
years of service, number of 1979 recipients in plan, and age at retirement.
bThe values in this column are calculated by dividing the ratios in the
preceding column by ratio of the change in the CPI between 1973 and 1979 to
the CP1 in 1973 (.633).23
ment coefficient to the predicted benefit for a white male union manufac—
turing worker retiring in 1972 with the sample mean values of 1979
recipients, age of retirement, and years of service. These figures are
divided by the ratio of 1973—79 CPI change to the 1973 CPI (.633) to obtain
the ratios of the percentage change in nominal benefits to the percentage
change in prices in the last column.
The regression coefficients show that percent increases in pension
benefits are much larger for those who have been retired the longest. The
average white male union manufacturing worker retiring in 1972 had a 22.8
percent larger pension in 1979 than in 1973. Workers who retired before
1964 received at least twice as large a percentage increase. This pattern
of larger benefit increases is caused by firms using increase formulas that
provide explicitly for larger increases to those retired for longer periods.
In addition, flat dollar increases will also give larger percentage
increases to long—term retirees who had lower initial benefits.
Although inflation need not have been a direct causal factor, an important
policy issue is how these increases compare to the change in the cost of
living over this period. We think they were surprisingly large. The conven-
tional view has been that pension benefits did not adjust at all. Instead we
find workers who retired before 1964 saw their benefits increase by more than
three-quarters as much as prices. Workers who retired between 1964 and 1967
saw their benefits increase by more than 50 percent of the price rise. The
workers who were most likely to have anticipated relatively little inflation
during retirement were also least likely to have witnessed a severe erosion in
real benefits.24
To determine the sensitivity of the results to the truncation of the depen-
dent variable at zero, the model was re-estimated using two different equations:
(1) a linear probability model of whether an increase was given between 1973 and
1979 and (2) the ratio of the benefit increase to 1973 benefits, estimated
over only those receiving at least one increase. These were estimated over
the sample of persons retiring between 1950 and 1972 and are reported in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.These findings are in general agreement with
those reported in Table 2. Increases in plan size raise the probability of
a persons having received any increase and the magnitude ofincreases con
ditional on having received at least one increase. Each 10,000 increase in
the number of 1979 recipients raises the probability of receiving at least
one benefit increase by 5.2 percentage points and the magnitudeof the total
increase between 1973 and 1979 by 2.4 percentage points Being in a union
plan raises the likelihood of receiving an increase by 22.6 percentage
points and the magnitude of increases by 12.3 percentage points amongthose
receiving increases. Years of service retains its strong positivecorrela—
tion with both measures of benefit increases, whereas increases in the age
of retirement lower the probability of receiving an increase but have no
effect on the magnitudes of increases among those receiving them.
The timing of increases is considered by examining the number of increases
given over the period (in column 3 of Table 4) and theratio of discounted
nominal benefits to fully indexed benefits (in column 4). Once again, the
overall picture from Table 2 is more or less unchanged. Larger plans gave
more increases and the increases were larger in presentvalue. Collectively
bargained plans, on average, gave one more increase thandid non—unionTable 4. Benefit change equations, l973_79a
Change in benefits Ratiodiscount
Increase 1973—79 1973 real benefits to
given between benefit; sampleNumber ofdiscounted real
Dependent 1973 and 1979restricted to thoseincreases benefits under
variable (yes=1) receiving increases1973—79 full indexation
Weighted mean
of dependent












1979 recipients .520 .241 6.090 .179
(times 10—s)
(.005) (.012) (.019) (.004)
Plan collectively .226 .123 1.086 .048
bargained (.003) (.008) (.010) (.002)
(yes =1)
Years of service .252 .402 .879 .139
(times 0.01) (.012) (.032) (.044) (.009)
Age at retirement-.134 -.016 .101 .007

















R2 .294 .056 .650 .084
N 137,038 123,469 137,038 137,038
ajhe regression equations include year of retirement and industrial
binary variables. In addition, two other binary variables indicating
whether collective bargaining status or sex is unreported are included.
The sample includes persons who retired between 1950 and 1972.25
plans. Individuals with long job tenure were more likely to receive
increases. On the whole, the basic findings seem quite robust as to the
specification of the dependent variable.
Con ci us ion
The empirical results provide strong evidence of compensating differentials
in final salary and initial benefits in firms providing post—retirement adjust-
ments. The strong weight given to years of service is consistent with the
use of benefit increases to regulate employee mobility. The results also
show that post—retirement adjustments are larger in large plans and in plans
covered by collective bargaining agreements. This is consistent with the
notion that implicit contracts are more likely to be written when the like-
lihood of reneging on the contract is low. A final major finding of this
paper is that benefit increases tend to be largerfor those who have been
retired the longest.
Regardless of how these results are interpreted in theoretical terms,
they indicate strongly that the private pension system was much more responsive
during the 1970s inflation than was previously believed. Further, ourevi-
dence on tradeoffs between benefit increases and both wages and initia'
benefits suggests regulations requiring private pension indexation will
lower the welfare of those who prefer higher wages or initial benefits to
future benefit increases.
These results also suggest existing models of the costs of pension
benefits to employers (or equivalently, their value to employees) be re-
examined. With most beneficiaries receiving sizable post—retirement adjust—
ments, the present value of the expected stream of payments implied bythe26
benefit formula at the tinieof retirement will in most cases be a downwardly
biased measure of worker's pension wealth. This makes it impossible to use
an "explicit contract" framework to derive either the increment to this
wealth in each year of employment or the firm's total pension liability.
Since the empirical results imply workers earn larger post—retirement
adjustments with additional years of service, the tilt of pension accruals
toward the most senior workers has been underestimated in previous studies.
The "accrued benefit" approach for evaluating pension liabilities produces
misleading results for the same reason. Unless the implicit contract is
"unveiled," this approach will ignore an important part of the plan's
liabilities.
We do not claim to have identified fully all parameters of such
contracts. In future work it would be useful to explore the effects of such
variables as plan financial performance and training costs on benefit
increases to test directly the rationales we have offered rather than using
proxies such as plan size.It is also possible that the experience in the
l970s was atypical, a conjecture that can only be tested by examining data
sets from other periods.27
Footnotes
'TIAA—CREF has developed an explicit contract similar to the one
described here. TIAA-CREF Graded Payment Method allows a person to have
scheduled increases in benefits in exchange for a lower initial benefit.
2This condition holds for a given value of the riskiness of r, The con-
dition would have to be restated in terms of the expected utility of each party
to allow the riskiness of r to vary across plans.
3The contract for post—retirement adjustments may be desirable as a risk-.
sharing device even if it offers a lower expected rate of return than the
worker's own assets. This would be the case, for instance, if the variance of
the plan's rate of return is lower than the worker's or if their covariance is
negative.
4Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U. S. 157 (1971).
5unfortunately, our time series does not allow us to test whether the use of
post—retirement adjustments increased after the passage of ERISA. Simulation
experiments in Clark, Allen, and Sumner (1983) indicate that benefit increases
were awarded during the l950s and 1960s.
6See Duncan and Holrnlund (1983) for discussion of potential biases in esti-
mates of compensating differentials.
7lhese values are derived by assuming the 1973 benefit is twice the size of
the initial benefit for persons retiring during the l950s. A 2.9 percent
increase in 1973 benefits would represent approximately 6 percent of the ini-
tial benefit. The value of post—retirement adjustments would be greater if the
retiree has chosen a joint survivors option where the higher benefits28
would continue as long as the retiree or spouse survived. There were
insufficient data on the PBMF to determine if persons selecting joint sur-
vivorship received larger or more frequent increases.
8For a more detailed analysis of the effect of unions on post—retirement
increases as well as on the initial pension benefit, see Allen and Clark (1984).29
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